政府审计与地方政府项目扶持偏好研究

Achievement Induction,Government Audit and Local Government Project Support Preference

借鉴'舞弊三角'理论解释地方政府项目扶持偏好产生原因,并从官员行为和制度两方面分析了政府审计的纠偏路径;进一步的博弈分析显示,地方官员偏好扶持易出且快出成绩的项目,不仅是政绩诱导的结果而且也会给地方官员带来最大效用;而强有力的政府审计,则不仅会将地方官员的这一项目扶持偏好纠正,而且会进一步导向地方官员倾向扶持更有利于地方经济长远均衡发展的项目。

Drawing on the theory of'fraud triangle'to explain the reasons for the support preferences of local government projects,and analyzing the correction path of government audit from the aspects of official behavior and system;further game analysis shows that local officials prefer to support projects that are easy to produce and quick to produce results.It is not only the result of political achievement induction but also the most effective effect for local officials.The strong government audit will not only correct the local officials’preference for this project,but also further guide local officials to favor and support the local government.A project with long-term balanced economic development.