摘要
善意取得制度符合卡尔多—希克斯效率、波斯纳定理的要求,善意取得规则下交易活动中的交易成本小于原所有权人规则下的交易成本。在善意取得规则下,存在特定的受让人、原所有权人的注意水平,使得无权处分事故的社会成本最小。当法定善意标准是最优注意水平时,善意取得制度可以对原所有权人与受让人双方提供有效激励,预防无权处分事故的发生。对于善意标准的确定,当原财产所有人主张受让人为恶意时,必须举证证明以受让人的实际认识能力在交易当时的具体条件下不能排除对处分人是否具有处分权的合理怀疑。
The system of Bona Fide Acquisition is in conformity with Caldor-Hicks efficiency and the Theory of Posner. Trading costs in trading activities under Bona Fide Acquisition system are less than the trading costs under the Original Ownership Rule. In Bona Fide Acquisition system, attention at special level of the innocent assignee and the original owner can make the social cost the least in the accidents that rights are not entitled. When the legal standard of bona fide is at the optimal level of attention, the system can provide both the original owner and the assignee with effective incentives in order to prevent the accident of unauthorized disposal. With regard to determine the legal standard of bona fide, when the original owner claims that the assignee is malicious, he must provide evidence to prove that the assignee can’t rule out the reasonable doubt about unauthorized disposal by the practical powers of perception of the assignee in specific trading activities.
出处
《湖南涉外经济学院学报》
2012年第3期38-43,共6页
Journal of Hunan International Economics University
关键词
善意取得
效率
成本
激励
Bona Fide Acquisition
efficiency
cost
incentives