摘要
在我国经济增长模式从高速向高质转变的背景下,探索提升企业全要素生产率的新路径具有一定的现实意义。文章从公司的内部治理结构出发,将企业全要素生产率作为公司绩效指标,基于我国2010—2016年1974家A股上市公司的非平衡面板数据,采用随机效应模型,从股权结构、董事会结构和激励机制三方面研究公司治理结构与全要素生产率之间的关系。结果表明:(1)我国上市公司第一大股东持股与企业TFP存在倒U型关系;第一大股东为国有背景公司的企业TFP显著地低于非国有背景公司;(2)董事会规模与企业TFP负相关,而独立董事在董事会的比重对企业效率提升具有积极作用,此外,董事长兼任CEO对公司TFP也有显著提升作用;(3)高管薪酬对企业TFP提升有显著的正向激励效应。最后,依据实证结果提出以下政策建议:(1)要注重防范大股东"一股独大"导致的第二类委托代理问题,探索多层股权结构机制,提升股权制度灵活性与多样性;(2)公司在董事会构建时,不仅要规模适度,还应重视外部独立董事在公司治理中的积极作用,提升独立董事在董事会中的比重;(3)运用丰富多样的激励手段增强高层管理人员与股东间的利益协同性,以缓解与股东目标的不一致性所带来的利益冲突。
It is of enormous practical significance to investigate the determinants of TFP and explore the path of how to promote corporate TFP under the circumstance that economic structure transforms from high speed to high equality.Based on the unbalanced panel data of1973 A shares listed companies in China,weapplied the random effect model toestimate the relationship between corporate governance structure and TFP.Results illustrated the following things:firstly,there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between Chinese largest shareholder of the listed company and corporate TFP,and we also find listed companies whose first largest shareholder had a state-owned background couldgain a lower TFP.Secondly,there is a positive relationship between the size of the board and the enterprise TFP,and the independent director proportion has a significant relationship with enterprise TFP.Besides,the CEO duality have a significant promotion effect on the total productivity of the company.Thirdly,executive compensation could positively stimulate the TFP growth of enterprises.Finally,based on the empirical results,three suggestions are proposed:(1)Under the existing stock company’s shareholding system,attention should be paid to preventing the second-class principal-agent problem caused by the'big-share'major shareholder,and exploring multi-layer equity structural mechanisms to improve the flexibility and diversity of the equity system.(2)The company should choose a modest board size when the board of directors is established,and paying equal attention to the positive role of external independent directors in corporate governance,and increase the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors.(3)Enrich and use a variety of incentives to management to mitigate conflicts of interest between shareholders,enhance work enthusiasm.
作者
王洪盾
岳华
张旭
WANG Hong-dun;YUE Hua;ZHANG Xu(School of Economics,East China Normal University,200062)
出处
《上海经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期17-27,共11页
Shanghai Journal of Economics
基金
上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题"金融创新与科技创新的耦合机制研究"(项目批准号:2018BJB020)的阶段性成果
关键词
公司治理结构
公司绩效
全要素生产率
O-P法
L-P法
Corporate Governance Structure
Corporate Performance
Total Factor Productivity
O-P Method
L-P Method