信贷合约、合约履行效率与信贷约束——基于农户调查数据的经验分析

Credit Contract,Efficiency of Legal Enforcement for Credit Contract,Credit-constrained

在农村信贷市场上,对于信贷合约履行效率(法律执行效率)与信贷资源配置之间的关系,本研究的理论分析结果表明:如果信贷合约履行效率(法律执行效率)得以提升,则农户家庭信贷需求受约束的概率将降低,借款农户所获取的信贷量也会增加。运用多元选择的经济计量模型(Probit模型和Tobit模型),对重庆市农户调查数据进行实证分析,计量结果显示出与理论预测的一致性,即居住在法律执行效率低下地区的农户,其借款申请更可能面临着被拒绝,而且借款农户所获取的贷款量更可能会降低,相反,居住在合约履行效率较高地区的农户,其获取借款的可能性将增加。其政策启示在于:强化农村信贷合约有效履行的制度设施,创新农村信贷市场上的信贷合约及其履约机制。

In rural credit market,as for the relationship between the Efficiency of Legal Enforcement of Credit Contracts and allocation of credit to rural households,theoretical analysis show the probabilities of being credit-constrained for rural households(RHs)would be lowered,and the amount of debt for RHs would be increased,as long as the efficiency of legal enforcement of credit contracts was improved.The econometric results support the hypothesis,that is to say,the better efficiency of legal enforcement reduces the probability of being credit-constrained.RHs in the judicial districts(or countys)where legal enforcement is poorer are more likely to have a loan application denied,and the amount of debt of nonrationed RHs decreases when the efficient of legal enforcement worsens(and more likely to get lower loan volume),and vice versa.Policy implications include that institution infrastructure that rural credit contract is effectively enforced should be further strengthened,innovations for credit contracts and its enforcement should be encouraged.