高收入高税率:一个纳税激励机制的设计

The Enough Individual Income Taxes Can be Paid by Tax-Payer with High Income: A Kind of Incentive Mechanism of Taxes Payment with Social Security Function

针对当前高收入人群没有利益动机自觉按实际收入申报缴纳个人所得税的现状,借助信息经济学中的委托—代理理论,设计了一种"谁纳税,谁受益"的纳税激励机制模型,为解决高收入者纳低税问题提供了一种思路.

At present, taxpayer with high income have no motive to pay enough individual income taxes on the basis of his real income level according to tax law. So this paper developed a kind of incentive model of taxes payment with 'anybody who pays taxes will benefit from taxation paid by himself ' by use of principalagent theory of information economics.