非对称信息条件下的政府规制

Government Regulation under Asymmetric Information

在政府规制实践中 ,规制者和被规制者双方处于信息不对称状态。本文运用委托 -代理模型的基本思想 ,分析了 L M机制和伯圣科 -萨平顿规制合同等模型的内在机理 ,指出政府可以通过这些激励机制来打破被规制者对信息的垄断 ,从而提高规制效率 ,实现社会福利最大化。在此基础上 ,对我国转型经济中政府规制体制改革的路径进行了探索 ,提出在非对称信息条件下我国政府规制应引入激励性规制制度。

In the regulation practice, two sides of regulation are under the condition of asymmetric information. The paper analyzes the inherent mechanism of LM and Besanko-Sappington contract based on the Principal-Agent theory, and then concludes that the government can break down the information power monopolized by the regulated so that the regulation efficiency can be enhanced and the social welfare can be maximized. At last, This paper suggest that China should introduce this incentive regulation.