网络双向接入定价的效率分析

The Efficiency of Network Two-way Access Pricing

研究两个网络分别拥有瓶颈设施情形下的接入定价问题。在本文所构建的接入博弈模型中 ,网络运营商相互之间支付接入费用 ,并在网络服务零售市场上展开具有差异化的竞争 ,争夺市场份额 ;消费者根据理性预期注册网络后即被锁定 ;在网络服务商制订零售价格后 ,消费者决定网络服务消费量 .文中给出网络服务零售价格与接入价格的关系 ;并对接入定价进行效率分析 ,得到 Ramsey接入定价低于接入成本 ,而垄断接入定价高于接入成本的重要结果 ;此外 ,还讨论了接入定价的规制问题 .

We develop a game theoretic model to examine the issue of access pricing when each network company controls a bottleneck to which its rival must have access. Networks pay access charge to each other and compete in prices in retail market. Customer selects a network to enroll according to rational expectation, but she would be locked-in after enrollment. Given retail price, customer decides the volume of consumption(e.g. minutes of calling). We develop the relationship between retail price and access charge, and analyze the efficiency of access pricing. Besides, we discuss the regulation of access pricing. The main findings in this paper show that Ramsey access pricing is below access cost, whereas monopoly access pricing is above access cost.