倾销与反倾销博弈分析

Analysis of dumping & anti-dumping with game theory

据关贸总协定中对倾销的定义,价格因素在判断有无倾销行为起重要作用,所以,选用以价格为变量的伯川德博弈模型来分析倾销与反倾销是合适的。本文用静态博弈得到伯川德价格均衡和伯川德贝叶斯价格均衡,并对两个均衡结果做了比较分析,表明信息不完全可导致两博弈方的价格差距扩大,这使得进口方更容易错误地认为出口方有倾销行为。接下来,用不完全信息动态博弈分析了不存在倾销的低成本出口方更容易被反倾销。

According to the definition in ATT, the factor of price plays an important role in determining whether dumping happens or not. So it is rational that the price game model be chosen to study dumping & anti-dumping. The Bertrand Nash equilibrium and Bertrand Bayesian equilibrium are derived from static game model. Comparable study of two equilibrium indicates that incomplete information would make the price difference grewter, which encourages the importer to believe wrongly that the exporter has dumping action. Then it is proved that it is more possible that importer would accused the low cost exporter of dumping although he has no dumping action.