保险代理人管理中的信息不对称问题——一个理论分析框架

The Asymmetric Information Problems in Insurance Agents Management

信息不对称问题对保险代理人的管理影响巨大。利用保单类别噪音模型进行的理论分析表明,在信息不对称的情况下,为获得一个良好的均衡结果,保险公司应对保险代理人保持适当的怀疑,将保单质量与代理人的报酬给付联系起来。进入门槛抑制道德风险的作用关键在于保证一个可置信的威胁,最优均衡的达到有赖于外部力量,这就要求行业协会和监管机构的作用应进一步加强。

The asymmetric information problems have serious effects in insurance agents management. A model of insurance policy with class noise shows that insurance companies should take into account the policy quality when they pay commission to the insurance agents; the insurers should keep appropriate scepticism for the insurance agents; the key function of accession threshold is the credible threat; an optimized equilibrium depends on the outside regulation. 