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基于时间约束的不完全信息的战略协商模型 被引量:1

A Strategic Negotiation Model of Incomplete Information Under Time Constraints
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摘要 在实证的一对一协商中 ,协商Agent不仅要面临自己的最后期限的压力 ,同时又要预测协商对手的最后期限和其类型 ,协商Agent的协商战略必须满足理性与均衡的要求 提出了通过形式化的方法建立轮流出价协商模型 ,给出了轮流出价协商战略均衡的条件定义 ,求出了基于时间限制的不完全信息环境下满足均衡组合的协商战略 ,建立了依据均衡战略的实用化协商算法 ,最后分析了该算法产生的实验数据 ,并在相同环境下与Zeus协商模型比较显示 ,依从本模型的均衡战略的协商Agent能根据对对手的不确定信息的信念动态地采取行动 。 As far as the architecture of one to one negotiation for practical use is concerned, the strategies of a negotiation agent should satisfy the requirements of equilibrium and rationality when it faces the pressure of its deadline as well as the uncertainties about the types and the deadlines of its opponents In this paper, a strategic model for negotiation of alternative offers with a formal game theory is presented, a definition of equilibrium combination for negotiation of alternative offers is given, equilibrium strategies based on an incomplete information negotiation under time constraints are provided, and a practicable negotiation algorithm based on the equilibrium strategies is constructed Finally, the experiment data generated by the algorithm are analyzed In contrast to the agents based on the negotiation model of Zeus, negotiation agents, which follow the strategies of equilibrium combination in the model, can dynamically take actions according to the beliefs of uncertain information of the opponent agent to obtain the maximum expected utilities
出处 《计算机研究与发展》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2003年第2期136-142,共7页 Journal of Computer Research and Development
基金 国家自然科学基金 (69973 0 3 2 )
关键词 时间约束 不完全信息 战略协商模型 人工智能 AGENT 均衡 博弈论 negotiation agent equilibrium game theory
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参考文献10

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同被引文献14

  • 1高维义,彭华涛.价值链管理与供应链管理的协同性分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2004,26(5):150-153. 被引量:10
  • 2初颖,刘鲁,张巍.基于聚类挖掘的供应链绩效评价的标杆选择法[J].管理科学学报,2004,7(5):49-55. 被引量:7
  • 3杨茂盛,李涛,白庶.基于数据包络分析的供应链绩效评价[J].西安工程科技学院学报,2005,19(2):180-182. 被引量:8
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