规则、相机抉择和政策的动态不一致性研究——一般化的理论框架及其应用

A Study on the Rules,Discretion and the Dynamic Inconsistency of Policy --A General Theoretical Framework and Its Applications

本文对为什么在分权经济中人们要遵守游戏规则这个问题给出了分析"规则"、"相机抉择"和"政策动态不一致性"的一个一般化的理论框架。虽然本文在模型中假定"政府"和"公众"为动态决策的两个特定的利益主体,但是在理性预期的理论框架下,本文的结论几乎适用于所有利益群体的动态决策过程。我们认为,选择最好的规则,而不是选择最优的政策,才是政策实践的常道。

The paper offers a general theoretical framework to analyze the rules, discretion and the dynamic inconsistency of policy as to the question 'Why people need to observe game rules in a decentralized economy?'Although in our model ,we suppose the government and thd public to be two particular interests agents involved in dynamic decision making ,our conclusion reached in the paper can be applied to almost all dynamic edcision processes of interest resated people,under the theoretical framework of rational expectation.We hold that the common practice for conducting the economic policy is to select the best rules but not the optimal policies.