中国国有银行的资本金谜团

The Mystery of China's State-owned Banks' Capital

本文旨在考察中国国有银行资本金谜团的由来 ,并为破解该谜团提供一种可能的视角。本文的讨论表明 ,国有银行之所以能在真实资本极少得到补充且不良贷款比率居高不下的情况下保持稳定 ,是因为国家与居民在中国特殊的改革背景下建立起了一种奇妙的资本联盟。由于在这种联盟中 ,国家以声誉入股且具有不可分性 ,因此 ,中国国有银行改革的可行方式是谋求改变资产结构 ,而不是试图重组资本结构。

The paper argues that the well-functioning of the state-owned banks (SOBs) in China under the condition of severe undercapitalization and a high ratio of bad loans should be attributed to the existence of a special capital structure.In this structure,the state is the shareholder of SOBs on the basis of the reputation it owns rather than on the basis of the capital it provides.The party actually providing the capital are households.Between the two parties,there exists the alliance in terms of capital which has vigorously supported the government's effort in the direction of mobilizing financial residuals via SOBs.The cost has been the increasing risks resulting from low-quality bank loans.Undoubtedly,the government is more than willing to resolve the risks through reforming SOBs.However,the state reputation is unseparable.And that is why reforms in terms of capital structure have ended in failure.In light of this situation,the feasible alternative is to reform SOBs from the asset structure.