摘要
针对现有的供应链企业合作问题相关研究的局限性,构造了供应链企业合作的讨价还价博弈模型。该模型的重要特点是构造了一种随机出价模式,并考虑了双方协商破裂的可能性。基于模型分别对不存在其他选择以及存在其他选择的情况进行了博弈分析,证明两种情况下都具有唯一的子博弈精炼均衡结果,给出了双方的子博弈精炼均衡战略。对博弈结果的进一步分析证明构造的博弈模型具有先动优越性、外部收益相关性以及合作优越性等三个特性。
In order to remedy deficiencies in present studies on cooperation between supply chain enterprises, a bargaining game model is proposed with important traits of random offer pattern and breakdown possibility during the negotiation. Based on this model, two conditions of with and without other options are discussed respectively. It is proved that the subgame perfect equilibrium result is unique under either condition. Then sub- game perfect equilibrium strategies of both sides are given out. Further analysis of gaming result proves that this game model has three characteristics of first mover advantage, external revenue pertinence as well as cooperation advantage.
出处
《机械工程学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第2期123-128,共6页
Journal of Mechanical Engineering
基金
国家863计划基金资助项目(2001AA414630)。
