企业集团中违规处罚的信息和绩效传递效应研究

Information and Performance Transfer Effects of Fraud Regulation in Business Group

上市企业的违规行为受到监管处罚后将产生显著负向的短期市场反应,其经营环境和治理环境也将受到冲击。作为企业集团内的成员企业,当其受到违规处罚后,企业集团可以利用内部资本市场对其进行资源转移和支持,发挥风险共保机制作用,以平滑其业绩波动,满足监管者和投资者的预期。需要进一步探究的是,企业集团的这种资源支持行为在集团内部将会产生怎样的经济后果。将监管部门对上市企业违规的处罚行为和企业集团的相关理论整合在同一研究框架中,选取2003年至2015年沪深A股中非国有企业集团的上市企业作为研究样本,运用事件研究法和多元回归模型,探究监管部门违规处罚产生的信息传递效应和绩效传递效应,探讨集团实际控制人持股结构对这种绩效传递效应的影响,并从边际利润率、资产周转率、期间费用和借款成本4个方面解析绩效传递效应的作用路径。研究结果表明,当集团中有企业受到违规处罚时,同一集团未受处罚的成员企业的短期和长期市场反应均显著为负,即违规处罚的信息传递效应;在此之后,其他成员企业的业绩表现显著下降,即绩效传递效应,并且受到的处罚越严重,绩效传递效应越大。集团实际控制人的现金流权和两权分离程度对违规处罚的绩效传递效应有显著的调节作用。将绩效指标进行分解,当集团中有企业受到违规处罚时,同一集团其他成员企业的资产周转率提高、销售费用率减少,但管理费用率、财务费用率和借款成本显著增加。研究结果丰富了违规处罚经济后果的研究,也丰富了对企业集团中信息传递和绩效传递现象的理解。政府监管行为不仅对受处罚企业本身有惩戒作用,与受处罚企业相关联的企业也可能受到影响。因此,同一集团其他成员企业应提前做好相关的风险防范措施,以减少可能的冲击。

Being caught of fraud,company will suffer not only a significant lose in market value,but also a shock on its operating and governance environment.In terms of a business group,when a member firm is detected of fraud,the group can give support by resource transfer and coinsurance via the internal capital market.This would benefit the fraud firm in terms of performance smoothing and thus the fraud firm can meet the regulators’and investors’expectations.However,the question yet-to-be explored is how the resource support behavior affects other group member firms’performance.Integrating the fraud regulation and business group related theory into one framework and using the sample of non-sate owned business group from 2003-2015 in Chinese A stock market,this paper conducts empirical tests on the fraud regulation to investigate the information transfer effect.The paper also constructs multivariate regression models to carry out empirical studies on the information and performance transfer effects of corporate fraud regulation.We then discuss how the ownership structure of controlling shareholder affects the performance transfer effect and,further,analyze the possible mechanism of this performance transfer effect through profit margin(PM),asset turnover rate(ATO),expenses and borrowing costs.The paper finds that when a firm from a business group is punished by CSRC due to corporate fraud,the short-term and long-term market reactions of unpunished firms within the same business group are both significantly negative.This shows that corporate fraud enforcement generates information transfer effect within a group.Afterwards,the performance of other firms in the business group deteriorates significantly,therefore corporate fraud generates performance transfer effect and the performance transfer effect will be larger for more severe punishments.Further,the cash flow right and the degree of separation between cash flow right and control right are found to have significant moderating effects on the performance transfer effect.Finally,the study analyzes the possible mechanism of performance transfer effect and finds an increase in ATO,a decrease in sales expense,and significant increases in managerial expense rate,financial cost rate and the borrowing costs.The results in this study contribute to the literature on the economic consequences of fraud regulation and enrich our understanding on the information and performance transfer effects within business groups.The results indicate that the fraud detection has a punishing effect not only to the fraud firms themselves but also to other related firms.Therefore,member firms in business group are advised to take risk prevention measures to reduce potential negative impacts from corporate fraud regulation.