不同利益集团间环境行为选择博弈分析

The Dynamic Equilibrium Analysis of Different Interest Groups' Environmental Behavior

我国环境政策由地方政府负责执行,地方政府的环境行为直接影响着整个国家的环境质量。本文运用博弈模型统筹分析中央政府、地方政府、环保部门与社会公众间的复杂博弈。中央政府加大对地方政府问责力度,加大环保指标在地方政绩考核体系中比重,降低地方政府履行环境责任成本可以推动地方政府共同选择实施环境保护行为;改变目前地方环保部门的双重领导体制,明晰责任主体和主体职责,可有效提高环境治理绩效;提高社会公众的环保意识,培育环保的社会团体力量,让社会民众成为环境监督和问责主体可以有效推动政府环境责任履行。

Since environmental policy is implemented by local governments, environmental behaviorsof local governments directly influence the whole country's environmental quality. In this paper we usegame model to analyze the logic and the game process of different interest groups' environmental behavior,and conduct equilibrium solutions on games between local governments under the central government's ac-countability, games between environmental protection departments and local governments, and games be-tween the public and the local government in turn. The central government emphasizes the local governmentaccountability, increases the proportion of environmental protection index in the local government achieve-ments appraisal system, and decrease the cost of local government performance of environmental responsibil-ity, which can promote different local governments in the area to choose environmental protection strategyjointly; To change the dual leadership system of local environmental protection department, and to clear re-sponsibility body and main body's responsibility, can effectively improve the environmental governance per-formance; Improving the public environmental protection consciousness, cultivating the society force of envi-ronmental protection, and making the social public become the main body of environmental supervision andaccountability, can effectively promote the performance of government environmental responsibility.