政企合谋与经济发展

Collusions between Governments and Firms and Economic Development

本文认为,地方政府和企业之间的合谋是中国经济的高增长率和高事故率并存的原因。我们刻画了最优的防范合谋契约,在该契约下地方政府和企业拥有正的信息租金,防范合谋将给中央政府带来额外的成本。在临界值以下,赔偿金具有部分地替代监督和惩罚的作用。以最优的防范合谋契约为基准,我们解释了造成当前政企合谋大量存在的若干重要原因:中央政府防范合谋的成本太高、地方政府缺乏长远预期、企业被过度抽税、第四方监督失效和惩罚不可置信等。

We argue that it is the collusion between local governments and firms that leads to both high rates of economic growth and accidents in China. We investigate the optimal collusion-proof contract. Under this contract, local governments and firms obtain informational rents. Below some critical value, damage compensations have a partial substituting effect for supervision and punishment. In reality, collusions may exist due to problems such as high costs to prevent collusion, the myopia of local governments, and the lack of credibility of punishment.