失之东隅、收之桑榆:双边市场中的银行卡组织

Loses On One Side and Gains On the Other:Bankcard Payment System in the Two-sided Markets

本文研究了双边市场中的银行卡支付系统,其中的银行卡组织和商户都拥有垄断力量。在未考虑商户竞争的基准模型中,本文证明银行卡组织征收的双边费率与其在双边的固定成本支出和双边所获得的便利程度皆正相关。在拓展模型中,本文采用豪泰林博弈刻画商户之间的竞争,为了争夺市场份额,商户愿意接受的最高费率是其自身的便利和消费者的平均便利之和,这使得银行卡组织可以不向消费者收取刷卡费乃至提供补贴。

This paper studies the bankcard payment system in the two-sided markets where the bankcard organization and merchants both have market power. In the benchmark model we show that the side fee increases in the fixed setup costs and the convenience offered to customers. In the extended model, we adopt the standard Hotelling model to describe the competition among merchants. We show that the highest fee that merchants are willing to pay is the sum of their convenience and that offered to cardholders. This enables the bankcard organization to charge a zero fee on cardholders or even to subsidize them.