业绩补偿承诺与融资约束——基于中国并购的实证研究

Performance Compensation Commitments and Financing Constraints——An Empirical Study Based on M&A in China

本文针对2012年至2017年中国中小企业板和创业板上市公司的事件样本,考察了业绩补偿承诺的使用与并购公司融资约束之间的关系。通过倾向得分匹配法和内生性检验后发现,融资约束高的并购公司更倾向于使用业绩补偿承诺,且这种现象在民营企业中更加普遍。本文通过进一步分析发现,造成上述结果的根本原因是上市公司利用业绩补偿承诺的短期并购绩效和提升的股价进行外部股权融资,同时,在经济下行、货币紧缩和股价波动较大时利用业绩补偿承诺对未来盈利能力的'背书'作用平抑市场波动,从而获取更多的融资来源。最后,本文提出业绩补偿承诺对融资约束的影响是上市公司短期行为的结果。以上结论证明,业绩补偿承诺具有缓解上市公司融资约束的作用,为并购公司使用业绩补偿承诺的动机研究和相关政策的制定提供了新的视角和参考。

This paper examines the impact of performance compensation commitments and financing constraints of M&A companies on the sample of listed companies on SME and GEM board in China from 2012 to 2017.Through the propensity score matching method and endogeneity test,we find that M&A companies with high financing constraints are more inclined to use performance compensation commitments,and this phenomenon is more common in private enterprises.Through further analysis,this paper finds that the fundamental reason of the above results is that the listed companies take advantage of the performance compensation commitment to gain external equity financing through short-term M&A performance and raised share price.Besides,when the economic goes downturn,the monetary policy gets tightening and the stock price volatility is larger,the'endorsement'of future profitability function of performance compensation commitment can stabilize market volatility and thus provides more financing to listed companies.Finally,this paper proposes that the impact of performance compensation commitments on financing constraints is the result of short-term behavior of listed companies.The above results strongly prove that the performance compensation commitment has the effect of alleviating the financing constraints of listed companies,and this provides a new perspective related to the motivation of using performance compensation commitments for policy makers.