基于动态博弈的我国董事责任保险主体行为研究

Research on the Subject Behavior of Director Liability Insurance in China Based on Dynamic Game Theory

本文主要通过动态博弈方法研究董事责任保险的购买对董事行为的影响。在对国外研究进行梳理的基础上,本文通过经济学工具——博弈论(Game Theory)来分析董事责任保险对董事行为的影响。全文一共提供了四阶段的动态博弈模型,其中一阶段分析展示公司董事在没有外部约束的条件下,必然会选择不正当行为;二阶段则分析了引入董事责任保险后的效果;三阶段的分析中我们了解保险公司可以拒绝赔偿因董事不正当行为引起的诉讼;四阶段引入可以对董事责任保险做出处罚的政府机构,并讨论了强制投保的有效性。最后本文进行了总结并提出建议。

In this paper,the author mainly studies the effect of directors’purchasing liability insurance on the behavior of directors through the dynamic Game Theory.By referring to the foreign experience,the author made a detail analysis on the research of this topic.This paper analyzes the infl uence of directors’liability insurance on the directors’behavior by means of economic tools,the Game Theory.This thesis provides a dynamic game model of four stages,the fi rst stage is the analysis of directors in the absence of constraints,will inevitably choose improper behavior;the second stage analysis is the introduction of the directors’liability insurance;the third stage analysis that the insurance company can refuse compensation caused by directors misconduct proceedings;the fourth stage introduced government agencies that can make the punishment of directors’liability insurance,and we talk about the effect of compulsive insurance in the environment.Finally,the author made a conclusion and put forward suggestions based on the analysis of the previous content.