银行治理、代理成本与银行机构风险控制——以山东省为例的实证分析

Corporate Governance of Commercial Bank,Agency Cost and Risk-Taking——Evidence from Shandong Province

本文在银行治理的理论架构下探讨了治理机制、代理成本与商业银行风险承担等3个变量之间的关系并且采用山东省的调查样本进行了实证分析。实证结果表明,农信社的治理机制基本没有发挥降低代理成本的作用;在公司治理与风险控制关系方面,就单个公司治理机制看,农信社治理机制如股权结构、董事会规模在银行风险控制功能发挥了一定的作用;对于城区农信社而言公司治理有助于银行风险控制,但是从总体上看公司治理对风险控制没有发挥作用。

This paper examines the relationship among governance mechanism, agency cost and risk-taking of commercial banks under the theoretical framework of bank governance by analyzing samples of banks in Shandong Province.It is found that the corporate governance of rural credit corporations do not play a role in reducing agency cost.In the field of corporate governance and risk control,the governance mechanism of the rural credit cooperative such as shareholder structure and boards size,as far as single governance is concerned,perform well in the bank risk control.The corporate governance is beneficial to bank risk control for urban commercial banks in city,while it does not play any role in risk control in general.