产品市场竞争、高管权力与公司并购绩效

Product Market Competition, Executive Power and Corporate Merger and Acquisition Performance

本文以2013-2015年我国844起上市公司并购上市公司事件为研究样本,对高管权力、产品市场竞争与上市公司并购绩效三者之间的关系进行实证分析。实证结果表明:对总体样本进行检验,高管权力与上市公司并购绩效成负相关;将样本按照产品市场竞争程度分开检验,发现产品市场竞争可以调节高管权力与上市公司并购绩效之间的关系。与产品市场竞争程度较低的上市公司并购相比,产品市场竞争程度较高的上市公司并购中高管权力对并购绩效有更为弱化的负向影响。

This paper takes 844 cases of mergers and acquisitions of Listed Companies in China from 2013 to 2015 as samples,and makes an empirical analysis of the relationship among executive power,product market competition and mergers and acquisitions performance of listed companies.Empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between executive power and M&A performance of listed companies;the sample is tested separately according to the degree of product market competition,it is found that product market competition can adjust the relationship between executive power and M&A performance of listed companies.Compared with mergers and acquisitions of listed companies with lower product market competition,executive power in mergers and acquisitions of listed companies with higher product market competition has a more weakened negative impact on mergers and acquisitions performance.