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Research on the Optimization of Capital for the Governance of Bulk Coal in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region

京津冀地区散煤治理资金优化研究(英文)
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摘要 Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei each contributed to the comprehensive governance of bulk coal to treat bulk coal pollution in a mutually beneficial way in 2017. The cooperative game theory is used in this paper to study the environmental benefits and cost effectiveness brought about by this comprehensive governance strategy, primarily focusing on the issue of how to maximize the environmental benefits by choosing an appropriate strategy since the benefits to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei are closely related. Therefore, the linear optimization, game theory and Shapley value method in the cooperative game model are used to find the ways to minimize the total governance cost of bulk coal in the three areas. In addition, the issues of how to carry out rational distribution and transfer of governance capital among the three places are explored according to the actual amounts of consumption of bulk coal, the influence of the coal burning on the PM2.5 and the actual cost of coal governance in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in 2017. The results show that the governance task in Hebei Province is the most onerous, and requires more investment than the other two cities. Thus, it requires the support from other two cities, with the amount of increased capital required of about 600 million Yuan. At the same time, the cost saved after optimization in Tianjin is calculated to be the largest, which thus can be adjusted appropriately and allocated to Hebei for the governance of bulk coal. The model constructed in this paper can not only be used to solve the issues related to bulk coal consumption in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, but also to carry out the effective distribution of capital, by which a win-win scenario among the three places can be achieved. 2017年京津冀三地联合开展散煤综合治理工作,全面治理散煤污染。本文采用合作博弈论研究2017年度京津冀区域散煤综合治理中如何选择合适的策略才能使环境效益最大化的均衡问题。本文根据2017年度京津冀地区散煤治实际使用量、散煤燃烧对PM2.5的影响情况以及散煤实际治理成本,利用合作博弈模型中线性优化、博弈理论和Shapley值法研究京津冀地区散煤的治理总成本最小化以及治理资金在京津冀三省市之间合理分配及转移的问题。研究结果显示,在治理的过程中河北省的任务量最大,所需资金也最多,需要得到其他两市的资金支持,增资额度约为6亿元。同时,经计算得出天津优化后节省的成本最多,可以适当调整资金额度给予河北省散煤治理工作。本文的模型构建可以探讨解决京津冀地区散煤使用量的问题,还能通过对资金的有效分配使得三个省市达到合作共赢。
作者 DU Xiaolin FENG Xiangzhao ZHAO Mengxue WANG Min 杜晓林;冯相昭;赵梦雪;王敏(生态环境部环境与经济政策研究中心,北京100029)
出处 《Journal of Resources and Ecology》 CSCD 2019年第1期48-55,共8页 资源与生态学报(英文版)
基金 National Environmental Protection Strategy Decision Support(2023040019)
关键词 Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region bulk coal governance cooperative game Linear Optimization 京津冀地区 散煤治理 合作博弈 线性优化
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