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刍议农发行现代化的委托代理关系

Preliminary Discussions on the Principal-agent Relationship of the ADBC Modernization Issue
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摘要 建立现代化公司治理体系的核心是委托代理关系。所有权和控制权分离的特殊产权制度引致委托代理问题。农发行委托代理关系产生根源除了国企两权分离普遍存在的一般性外,还有信息不对称、激励不相容、责任不对等、契约不完全、委托人和代理人的目标函数不一致和不确定性等因素。作为唯一一家农业政策性银行,农发行委托代理关系不仅是国企治理结构现代化问题,还关系到落实政府宏观调控意图及维持经济稳增长的政策性金融职能定位。 To establish a modern corporate governance system is the core of principal-agent relationship.Due to the separation of ownership and control rights,the special property systems lead to the principal-agent problem.The Agricultural Development Bank of China(the ADBC) 's principal-agent relation is ubiquitous among state-owned enterprises,apart from the two rights separation of ownership and control rights,there exist asymmetry information,incompatible incentive,unequal responsibility,incomplete contract,the different objective functions of the principal and the agent,uncertainties and other factors.As the sole agricultural policy bank,the ADBC relationship of ownership and control rights is not only about governance structure modernization in state-owned enterprises,also relates to the macroeconomic regulation and control to carry out the government intentions,involves the policy financial function localization to maintain steady economic growth.
作者 蒋沐钊
出处 《金融发展评论》 2016年第10期147-151,共5页 Financial Development Review
关键词 农发行 现代化 委托代理关系 ADBC Modernization Principal-agent Relation
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