摘要
本文以2005—2013年中国上市公司CEO换届事件为样本,通过构建CEO权力指数划分出CEO更替的四种不同类型,进而对CEO换届公告对股票的公告效应(股票的异常收益率)以及股东财富的影响进行了实证分析。实证结果表明,对大多数公司而言,CEO被迫离职会产生显著的正累积平均异常收益,而权力较大的CEO继任对累积平均异常收益作用比其他几种权力转换类型更大。然而,CEO无权继任时上市公司股价的波动率会显著下降,从而在整体上给股东财富带来了积极的影响。因此,本文认为无权继任是更为合适的CEO权力转换形式。
Based on China’s CEO turnover sample from 2005 to 2013,this paper investigates the relationship CEO turnover and announcement effect and shareholder wealth,and examines whether the CEO power play an important role in this relationship.Our result reveals that the announcement effect tends to present higher if the CEO is forced to resign and that the powerful successor would impose more significant effect on cumulative average abnormal return.However,a CEO successor with less power would contribute to lower volatility and improve the shareholder wealth.Therefore,we believe that a successor with less power should be the most appropriate type for CEO turnover.
作者
刘舫舸
刘伟
郭俊杰
Liu Fangge;Liu Wei;Guo Junjie
出处
《公司金融研究》
2015年第1期53-71,共19页
Journal of Corporate Finance
基金
中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目(13XNJ003)的资助
