薪酬激励对过度投资的影响:CEO特质的调节作用

Influence of Compensation Incentive on Overinvestment:Moderating Role of CEO heterogeneity

针对当前关于高管薪酬激励是否有效的争议热点,引入CEO特质的差异影响,探析货币薪酬对CEO特质的敏感性以及CEO特质在货币薪酬和过度投资关系中的调节效应。以2009—2013年沪深主板A股上市公司为样本,实证结果发现:总体上CEO特质和货币薪酬存在关联,表现在年龄、学历和任期与货币薪酬正相关,而性别与薪酬无显著性关系;薪酬激励能够抑制过度投资,CEO学历通过知识效应加强了薪酬对过度投资的抑制作用,但年龄和任期的代理效应弱化了薪酬对过度投资的抑制作用,并发现国有公司和两职合一公司薪酬激励对抑制过度投资的无效性。从过度投资角度揭示了CEO特质对薪酬激励效应的作用机制,为合理制定薪酬合约和高管聘任等提供借鉴。

In view of the current disputes over the efficiency of executive compensation incentive,this paper introduces the different influence of CEO heterogeneity,analyzes the sensitivity of monetary compensation and CEO characteristics,and also the moderating effect of CEO characteristics in the relationship between monetary compensation and overinvestment.Selecting the sample from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2013,we come to conclusions as follows;CEO compensation is sensitive to CEO age,degree and tenure other than gender;CEO compensation has inhibiting effect on overinvestment.CEO degree,on account of its knowledge effect,strengthens the inhibiting effect of compensation on overinvestment,while CEO age and tenure mitigate the inhibiting effect of compensation to over-investment with agency effect.In addition,compensation incentive has no effect on overinvestment in state-owned and CEO duality companies.This paper reveals the mechanism of CEO characteristics acting on compensation incentive effect based on excessive investment behavior,and provides some guidance on compensation contract design and employment.