期刊文献+

资本预算超支原因:基于扎根理论的实证研究

下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文以上市公司已完工的资本项目为对象,采用扎根理论方法,研究资本预算超支的原因。根据110个完工项目的数据分析结果,归纳得出如下结论:代理理论和环境变动理论对资本预算超支都具有解释力,资本预算超支既可能是代理问题引至,也可能是环境变动引至,也可能是二者同时作用的结果。
出处 《中国商界》 2010年第4X期32-34,共3页 Business China
  • 引文网络
  • 相关文献

参考文献8

二级参考文献41

  • 1贺振华.寻租、过度投资与地方保护[J].南开经济研究,2006(2):64-73. 被引量:32
  • 2郝颖,刘星,伍良华.基于内部人寻租的扭曲性过度投资行为研究[J].系统工程学报,2007,22(2):128-133. 被引量:18
  • 3王明虎.从寻租视角看集团企业内部资本市场和资源配置效率[J].经济理论与经济管理,2007,27(7):61-64. 被引量:9
  • 4Salter, S. and Sharp, D.. Agency Theory and Escalation of Commitment: Do Small National Culture Differences Matter? [J].The international Journal of Accounting,2001,36:33-45.
  • 5Harrison, P. d.& Harrel,A.. Impact of ‘Adverse Selection' on Managers Project Evaluation Decisions[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1993,36(3) :635 -643.
  • 6Whyte,G.. Escalating Commitment to a Course of Action: A Reinterpretation. [J].Academy of Management Review, 1986,11 (2): 311-321.
  • 7Garland, H..Throwing Good Money After Bad: The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Decision to Escalate Commitment to An ongoing Project[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,1990,6:728-731.
  • 8Arkes H.R.and Blumer C.. The psychology of Sunk Costs[J]. Organizational behavior and Human Decision Processes,1985,35:124- 140.
  • 9Garland, H. and Newport,S.. Effects of absolute and relative sunk costs on the decision to persist with a course of action[J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1991,1:55-69.
  • 10Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny.. Politicians and Fimls[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 995-1025.

共引文献373

;
使用帮助 返回顶部