代建制下代建方违规行为的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Agent's Irregularities under Agent Construction System

运用博弈论的相关理论研究代建方违规屡禁不止的原因,构造政府与代建方的博弈模型并进行求解分析。博弈结果表明在当前条件下,虽然强化监管强度,加大惩罚力度,降低监管成本,可以降低代建方违规程度,但不能完全杜绝违规;政府的监管不仅不会给政府带来收益,反而需要付出额外的成本。分析得到,造成这一现象的深层次原因是政府监管滞后,缺乏对代建方的有效激励,以及代建市场诚信体制的缺失,对此提出相应的政策建议。

This article analyses agent's illegal behaviors in agent construction system with game theory. To find out the reasons why government can't forbid it effectively, the article builds and solves a government-agent game model. It concludes that, at current conditions, while strengthening regulatory strength, increasing punishment for illegal behaviors and reducing regulatory cost can reduce the degree of illegal behavior, but can't completely eliminate it. The government's optimal supervision can't bring revenue to the government, but have to bear the extra cost. The fundamental reasons for these phenomena are the lag of supervision and the lack of integrity of the agent construction market, which caused by information asymmetry. Then, the article gives some policy recommendations for su-pervising and managing agent's violations better.