摘要
电网建设场地赔偿费用是造价成本的重要组成部分,但在实际赔付过程中,由于电网公司不能准确获得场地信息,对于业主的赔偿费用具有随机性,存在超概算或者资金浪费的风险,成为电网工程造价控制的难点。首先,根据微观经济学的效用理论建立关于业主的场地赔偿效用函数;然后,基于贝叶斯博弈中的机制设计理论,构建以电网企业经济效益最大化为目标的赔偿合同机制模型,并通过等价转换,对模型进行求解;最后,考虑到电网建设工程的外部效应,对相应的外部成本进行量化分析。
The compensation costs of power grid construction sites is the important part that constitutes the capital cost,but the power grid corporations can't obtain the accurate information of the owners of the sites,which leads to the stochastic nature of the compensation costs and the risk of exceeds budgetary estimate. Aiming at the problem above,constructs the compensation utility function for the owners based on the utility theory of the microeconomics;then designs the mechanism models aiming at the maximization of the power grid enterprises,which is solved by means of the mechanism design theory;at last,carries out the quantification analysis of the external costs considering the externality of the power grid construction projects.
出处
《建筑经济》
2015年第3期54-57,共4页
Construction Economy
关键词
电网工程
造价控制
场地赔偿
效用函数
机制设计
power grid project
cost control
site compensation
utility functions
mechanism design