大卫·查默斯的自然主义二元论

David Chalmers' naturalistic dualism

大卫·查默斯在区分意识难易问题的基础上,主张一种自然随附的属性二元论。他认为感受性质不是实体,而是根源于物理实体原现象性质的一种根本属性。感受性质源于原现象性质,物理属性基于物理实体之间的关系,因此感受性质并非在逻辑上随附于物理性质,而是一种独立存在的属性。连接物理和感受性质或现象意识之间的桥梁就是心理物理学定律。从维特根斯坦对语言批判的维度看,查默斯的原现象概念、现象概念与物理概念分别属于不同的哲学范畴,它们不可能遵循同样的科学原则和精神,因此自然主义二元论有其内在的语言学困境。

When deciding the difficulty of consciousness,David J.Chalmers advocates a natural property dualism or the qualia,which is not an entity,but a property rooted in proto-phenomenal property of phy-sical entities.Since the qualia derives from proto-phenomenal property and physical property from physical entities,the qualia is an independent property naturally,rather than logically,collateral to physical property.The bridge between physics and qualia or phenomenal consciousness is the psychophysics laws.From the perspective of Wittgenstein’s linguistic criticism,Chalmers’proto-phenomenal,phenomenal and physical concepts are different categories and cannot follow the same scientific principle,hence an intrinsic linguistic dilemma in his naturalistic dualism.