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反向支付的反垄断法适用 被引量:7

Regulation of Reverse-Payment in Antitrust Law
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摘要 反向支付出现于美国医药专利领域,是专利药厂为阻止仿制药厂推出仿制药与其达成的和解协议,由于其限制、排除竞争的市场作用,侵害了消费者享受廉价药物的权益。但考察其成因可以发现,反向协议的出现是专利制度不足带来的必然结果,在发明人无法获得相对较为合理的专利权保护期限,前期投入不能得到弥补并获得合理经济利润的情况下,反向支付势所必然,美国Hatch-Waxman法的出现只是使得这一问题更加突出,反向支付的范围也不会局限于美国医药专利领域,在符合特定条件的情况下,其他国家、其他行业也会出现这一问题。反向支付有其特定的社会基础,需要存在一定的经济条件和法律环境的共同作用,才能使得专利权人与仿制企业达成共谋,侵害消费者的利益。 Reverse-Payment appears in the field of medical patent in U.S.A which in fact is a settlement of medical patent holder deliver economic interest to imitating enterprise to preventing it from producing and selling imitating drugs. It deprives consumers from accessing cheaper medicines. However, if we investigate the background, we would find out that reverse-payment is inevitable considering the imperfect patent system, where inventors cannot obtain adequate economic income from their investment. Hatch-Waxman Act makes this situation more prominent. Furthermore, reversepayment may occur in other field in other countries. There is particular social background for reverse-payment, when economic condition and legal environment combined together, patent holder and imitating enterprise close a deal which may violate consumer's social benefits.
作者 陶冠东
出处 《竞争政策研究》 2017年第3期80-89,共10页 Competition Policy Research
关键词 反垄断法 专利法 社会基础 反向支付 Antitrust law Patent law social background reverse-payment
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  • 1陈武.美国药品专利诉讼中的反向支付协议——以Cardizem CD及Valley Drug案为研究进路[J].知识产权,2007,17(4):82-87. 被引量:9
  • 2Loeb & Loeb LLP. U.S. Supreme Court Argument on"Reverse Payments" Suggests Potential for Compromise Holding Not Advocated By FTC or Pharmaceuticals Industry[OL].http://www.loeb.com/news/ArticleDetail.aspx article=2047,2013.
  • 3Olga Gurgula. Restrictive Practices in Pharmaceutical Industry:Reverse Payment Agreements Seeking for a Balance between Intellectual Property and Competition Law[J].Global Antitrust Review,2012,(05):68-69.
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