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美国人力资源市场反垄断及其启示——以美国《2016人力资源领域反垄断指南》为核心 被引量:4

Antitrust in American Human Resource Market and Its Enlightenment——Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals in 2016 as the Core
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摘要 人力资源的竞争是市场竞争的重要内容。"互不挖角"协议、固定工资协议和交换敏感信息是人力资源市场限制竞争的三类典型行为。美国于上世纪中叶就将反垄断制度适用于人力资源市场竞争秩序的维系,逐步发展出一系列案例和规则。2016年底,美国发布了《2016人力资源领域反垄断指南》,对人力资源市场反垄断实体制度予以明细化,进一步强化了人力资源市场反垄断的实施机制,标志着美国人力资源市场反垄断迈向严格化。美国上述制度与实践对完善我国反垄断法在人力资源领域的适用规则具有重要启示意义和借鉴价值。 The competition of human resources is an important part of market competition. "No poaching" agreements, wage-fixing agreements and sharing sensitive information are three typical behaviors of the human resource market to restrict competition. In the middle of the last century, the United States applied the antitrust regime to the maintenance of the competitive order of human resources market and gradually developed a series of cases and rules. At the end of 2016, the United States issued the Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals,elaborated the antitrust entity system in the human resources market, and further strengthened the enforcement mechanism of antitrust in the human resources market, marked antitrust in the human resources market in the United States toward the strict. The above system and practice of the United States have important enlightenment significance and reference value for improving the application rules of China's antitrust law in the field of human resources.
作者 王红霞 臧骞
机构地区 中南大学法学院
出处 《竞争政策研究》 2017年第5期122-130,共9页 Competition Policy Research
基金 国家社科基金项目"产业融合视域下平台竞争规制与用户权益保障机制研究"(14CFX041)的阶段性研究成果
关键词 人力资源市场 反垄断 “互不挖角”协议 固定工资协议 敏感信息交换 human resources market antitrust "no poaching"agreements wage-fixing agreements sharing sensitive information
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