银行监管制度中委托—代理问题与效率损失

On Principal-Agent Problem &Efficiency Loss in Banking Supervision System

委托—代理理论作为企业理论的重要分支 ,探讨了在信息不对称情况下企业内委托人和代理人之间激励—约束合约的特点 ,它同样适用到银行监管制度中。储蓄者与银行之间存在信息不对称问题 ,且由于二者的目标利益不一致 ,责任不对等 ,需要银行监管者代表储蓄者对银行进行监督。银行监管者虽然在一定程度上克服了储蓄者与银行的信息不对称问题 ,但由于监管权力的委托代理运行和储蓄者监督的机会主义等问题 ,仍无法完全实现储蓄者的利益。

The Principal-and-Agent Theory, primarily a part of Theories on Firms, analyzes the characteristics of incentive-constraint contracts between the principal and the agent within a firm in the case of asymmetric information. It also applies to the system of banking supervision. A problem of asymmetric information does exist between a bank and a depositor. It's necessary for banking supervisors to regulate banks as a representative of depositors due to distinct target interests and unbalanced liabilities between bankers and depositors. Though the banking supervisor can overcome the problem of asymmetric information to some extent, the interests of depositors couldn't be fully realized yet because of problems such as entrusting operation of regulation power, opportunism in regulation by depositors