摘要
关于货币政策操作规范的“规则对权变”之争历时 15 0余年。在早期的争论当中 ,“规则”论点与“权变”论点相比 ,始终都是稍逊一筹。 2 0世纪 70年代动态不一致性问题的引入 ,使争论的局势开始发生根本性的转变。而其后所提出的公信力与灵活性的差异及其相互替换的问题 ,又一度使争论的结果变得扑朔迷离。现阶段的研究集中于分析不同货币政策规则的利弊得失。随着争论的深入 ,越来越多的经济学家认为 ,如果中央银行按照事先确定的某种指引或约束机制而不是自由地施行无限制的权变型货币政策 ,将会更加有助于货币政策操作绩效的发挥。
The 'rules versus discretion' debate about monetary policy operational guideli nes lasted more than 150 years. In the earlier period, 'rules' was slightly in ferior to 'discretion'. In the 1970s, the introduction of dynamic inconsistenc y resulted in a fundamental shift in the controversy. The difference between pub lic credence and flexibility and their interchangeability suggested later confus ed the issue again. With the deepening of the controversy, more and more economi sts believe that if the central bank follows some guidelines or constraint mecha nism set beforehand, instead of freely implementing unrestricted discretionary m onetary policies, it can help bring into play the operational performance of mon etary policies.
出处
《贵州财经学院学报》
2003年第2期20-24,共5页
Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics
关键词
货币政策
操作规范
“规则对权变”
货币政策规则
monetary policy
operational guidelines
rules versus discretion
monetary polic y guidelines