浅析同行评议中的委托代理问题与激励约束机制

A Brief Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem and Incentive Mechanism in Peer Review

同行评议是自然科学基金项目评审的重要环节和内容之一。同行评议的有效性和公正性,直接决定了科学基金资助工作的质量。由于国家自然科学基金委员会与评议人之间存在信息不对称,同行评议不可避免地存在相应的逆向选择和道德风险问题。本研究基于经济学的委托代理理论,结合科学基金同行评议目标,提出了解决逆向选择问题的智能信息匹配机制、自我信息甄别机制和契约约束机制。同时本研究还提出了解决道德风险问题的计贡献报酬激励机制、讲信誉声誉约束机制和负责任退出约束机制等。本研究试图为科学基金'负责任、讲信誉、计贡献'的评审机制改革目标提供理论依据,为提高科学基金同行评议的有效性和公正性提供理论启示。

Peer review is an important procedure and content of th e project evaluation of natural science funds.The effectiveness and impartiality of peer review directly determine National Science Foundation’s performance.Due to the information asymmetry between NSFC and reviewers,peer review inevitably has the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.Based on the principal-agent theory in economics and the target of peer-reviewed,this study proposes the mechanism to solve the problem of adverse selection,including intelligent information matching mechanism,selfinformation identification mechanism and contract constraint mechanism.This study also proposes a mechanism to solve the problem of moral hazard,including the incentive mechanism based on contribution reward,the constraint mechanism based on reputation,and the constraint mechanism based on responsible withdrawal.This study attempts to provide a theoretical basis for the reforms of the evaluation mechanism of'responsible,creditable and contributory'of science funds,and provide a theoretical inspiration for improving the effectiveness and impartiality of peer review of science funds.