摘要
基于斯彭斯信号传递与甄别模型的基本原理,分析了大学生求职就业市场上存在的"信息不对称"、"供求错位"现象以及市场新特点,从而说明文凭和教育的信号传递作用可以较好地显示个人能力的高低。提出了大学生可通过理性把握文凭的强信号作用、合理规划职业生涯、强化专业及竞争能力、注重诚信等方面的努力,增强其就业能力信号的显示度。
Based on Spence signal transduction and screening model, this paper analyzes the phenomenon of 'information asymmetry', 'mismatch of supplying and demanding' when university graduates search jobs, to show the signal of diplomas may mean a better individual ability. So university graduates should make a reasonable career planning, to improve the competitiveness in the employment market.
出处
《科技创业月刊》
2010年第1X期115-117,120,共4页
Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology
关键词
信号显示
大学生求职
文凭
教育成本
信号传递
signal display, university graduates search jobs, diploma, education cost, signal transfer