摘要
胡塞尔认为,自我意识是知觉世界构造的出发点,因此自我意识的承载者自我身体是知觉空间定向的中心。即使在身体不是定向零点的情况下,自我仍然是空间定向的中心。这种强烈的自我中心主义几乎贯穿了整个现象学运动。霍伦施泰因驳斥这种自我中心主义的办法是:区别知觉的出发点与定向的中心点,而指出自我是知觉的出发点,但不是绝对的定向中心。但从唯识学来看,所谓自我或纯粹意识也不是最终的出发点,因为它们仍然是被建构的。它们也没有那种独存的、恒久不变的特性。
Husserl claims that self-consciousness is the origin of the construction of perception world,as its bearer,theself-body is the center of perception space. Even though the self-body isn't the orientation zero,the self is still the centerof spatial orientation. This strong egocentrism penetrates almost the whole movement of phenomenology. Holenstein's wayto reject it is to differentiate the origin of perception and the center of spatial orientation,and to point out that the self is theorigin of perception,but not the absolute center of spatial orientation. However,from the perspective of Yogacara,the selfor pure consciousness isn't the ultimate origin because they are constructed too without characteristics of independence andimperishability.
出处
《科学.经济.社会》
2014年第3期28-31,37,共5页
Science Economy Society
基金
2013年浙江省哲社规划"之江青年课题""东西方生命观及身心实践技术"(13ZJQN100YB)
2014年国家留学基金项目资助(201408330439)的阶段性成果