摘要
作为规范会计理论的两大学派:受托责任学派和决策有用学派只是片面地以委托方对会计信息的要求作为会计目标,忽略了会计信息系统中各利益相关者之间在会计信息质和量的规定性的界定上的利益冲突和会计信息系统这种制度安排的激励机制效应以及会计信息披露成本的制约。本文通过对会计信息系统中各利益相关者之间在涉及会计事项的各类交易中的利益冲突与“纳什均衡”转换机理的分析,逻辑推导出“纳什均衡”状态下的会计信息质和量的规定性和财务会计目标。
As the two schools on accounting theory,the school on responsibility-entrusting and on decision-making usefulness only unilaterally consider the requirements of the trustor for accounting information as accounting objectives.They just neglect the interest conflict defining the regulation of quality and quantity of accounting information between the interested users in the accounting information system.They also neglect the effect of the incentive mechanism of the system and the cost restriction reporting accounting information.In view of the drawbacks,the essay logically deduces the regulation of quality and quantity of accounting information under 'Nash Equilibrium' and financial accounting objectives by analyzing the transforming mechanism of 'Nash Equilibrium' and the interest conflict between the interested users in the various accounting transactions in the system.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第10期7-12,96,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
湖南省教育厅资助课题"会计信息系统中的利益冲突与均衡转换机理研究"的部分研究成果