当有些东西用钱买不到的时候:一项关于多投标人跨境收购拍卖的研究（英文）

When Money Can’t Buy Everything:A Study of Multiple Bidder Cross-Border Acquisition Auctions

本文研究不同国家的跨国投标人的收购行为,他们往往为了收购一个目标公司成为彼此的竞争者。拍卖的规则是,给出最高价格的投标人理所当然地获得胜利。然而,我们的实证证据表明,企业为了并购,不能仅仅通过抬高价格赢得竞争性拍卖。首先,我们采用交易成本理论来描绘跨国投标人拍卖活动的复杂性、不确定性和机会成本。其次,我们认为,目标企业会降低交易成本,评估投标人的一些价格以外的因素。我们从知识基础观点和制度理论来确定这些非金融变量。我们发现,相对较新的机构,投标人和目标公司之间的距离减少了胜利的机会,尽管投标人出价很高;而相对实力相当的机构和投标人相关的经验增加了中标概率,尽管价格略低。因此,企业不能仅依靠支付给目标公司股东一大笔钱就能成功地进行国际收购。相反,他们还需要克服外来责任,获得合法性,并展示相关的能力,以便在国际上多个拍卖中取得成功。我们的论文率先推出跨境拍卖管理文献和实证证明事务的应用程序,因为我们是基于经济学、制度理论和KBV的背景提出的。

This paper studies cross-border multiple bidder acquisitions in which many bidders from different countries compete against each other for acquiring a single target firm. In an auction setting, highest price is expected to determine the victory of a bidder. However, our empirical evidence demonstrates that firms cannot win competitive auctions for corporate acquisitions just by outbidding their competitors. First, we employ transaction cost theory to map complexity, uncertainty and opportunity costs involved in cross-border multi-bidder auctions. Then, we argue that target firms reduce transaction costs by evaluating bidders on a number of factors besides price. We draw from knowledge-based view and institutional theory to pinpoint such nonfinancial variables. We find that relative neo-institutional distances between bidders and target decrease the victory chances despite high offer prices;whereas relative comparative institutional distance and relative bidders’ prior experiences increase the winning probabilities despite slightly lower prices. So, corporations cannot successfully make international acquisitions just by paying large sums of money to the shareholders of target firms. Instead,they also need to overcome the liability of foreignness, earn legitimacy, and demonstrate relevant competencies to be successful in an international multiple bidder auction. Our paper is the first to introduce cross-border auctions in management literature and to empirically demonstrate the applications of transaction cost economics, institutional theory and KBV in this novel context.