基于相互套牢的创业企业控制权最优配置研究

Optimal allocation of control rights based on hold-up to each other

本文以不完全契约为基础,在金融契约和控制权配置理论的框架内,从缓解企业家与投资家相互套牢问题的角度,在扩展企业家风险偏好、假设企业状态变量不可证实的基础上,通过引入企业家事前努力水平、企业家与投资家讨价还价能力、企业中期绩效信号、投资家投资额、管理监督成本、项目清算价值等变量,建立了创业企业控制权动态配置模型,通过比较不同控制权配置方式下的双方收益与企业价值,确定控制权最优配置,研究表明:相机控制与投资家控制交替实现控制权最优配置;当企业家讨价还价能力较强时,或较弱时,如果绩效信号较低,投资家控制最优,企业价值不会随之变化;当企业家讨价还价能力较弱并低于临界值,如果绩效信号较高,相机控制最优,反之投资家控制最优,企业价值随之发生相应变化。

Based on incomplete contract,from the angle of relieving investor and entrepreneur hold up the other party,based on extending the risk preferences of entrepreneur and assuming firm's state variable,by introducing the entrepreneur's ex ante effort,entrepreneur and investor's bargaining power,firm's interim performance signal,investor's investment,manage and monitor cost,project's liquidation values,etc.,the paper builds up the model of dynamic control rights allocation in VC-backed firms,by comparing the investor and entrepreneur's payoffs and firm's value of different control rights allocation,to determine the optimal control rights allocation. The results of research show that,investor control and contingent control alternate to realize the optimal control rights allocation:when the entrepreneur's bargaining power is stronger or lower,and if the firm's performance signal is lower,the investor control allocation can be optimal,and the firm's value does not change; when the entrepreneur's bargaining power is lower and is lower than the threshold,and if the firm's performance signal is higher,the contingent control allocation can be optimal,otherwise the investor control allocation can be optimal,the firm's value changes according to the change of each variable.