控股股东两权分离度与公司债务期限结构的关系研究

Relationship between the Voting and Cash-flow Rights Divergence of the Controlling Shareholder and the CorporatDebt Maturity Structure

采用2010—2014年可获得信息的2 363家沪深两市A股上市的非金融公司,共计9 751个观测值组成的非平衡面板数据,从委托代理视角推演控股股东两权分离度与公司债务期限结构的关系,并运用最小二乘法(OLS)和两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS)进行实证检验。研究发现,控股股东两权分离度与公司债务期限结构呈显著正相关关系。由此,本文认为控股股东的现金流权与控制权分离程度越大,选择长期债务规避债权人监督的可能性越大。

Using data of 2 363 non-financial listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the period 2010—2014, a total of 9 751 observations consisting of unbalanced panel data,this paper means to analyze relationship between the voting and cash-flow rights divergence of the controlling shareholder and corporate debt maturity structure from the agency prospective,and examine it empirically using OLS and2 SLS. This paper finds that the voting and cash-flow rights divergence of the controlling shareholder has a significant positive correlation with the company s debt maturity structure.This paper argues that the greater of the separation of the controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights,the greater the choice to avoid the longterm debt creditors’ supervision.