摘要
由于委托人与代理人利益的不一致和信息的不对称,委托—代理关系往往会导致“代理问题”。在我国国有企业体制转轨时期,这一问题尤为突出。原因主要有:资本市场不发达;经理人员市场起步晚;代理链过长;代理人责权利不对称等。而要解决这一“代理问题”,必须尽快建立新型的激励约束机制。
Owing to disagreement between interests of principals and those of agents, and information asymmetry, principal & agent relationship often results in 'agent problem', which is highlighted during transforming of state-owned firm regimes. The reasons for that problem are as follows:under developed capital market; delayed development of agent market; too long agent linkage; unequal responsibilities, rights and benefits amongst a-gents. We must establish new impel-constraining mechancism to solve this 'agent problem'as soon as possible.
出处
《河南金融管理干部学院学报》
北大核心
2003年第2期83-85,共3页
Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres