摘要
为了说明企业技术创新在市场竞争中的重要性,比较了两种市场结构下的差异产品的博弈论模型:选择数量竞争垄断者的Cournot(古诺)双头寡占市场模型和选择价格竞争垄断者的Bertrand(贝特朗)双头寡占市场模型,说明了在现实的市场竞争中,Cournot竞争和Bertrand竞争都不是孤立存在的,而是随着竞争的进行,由Cournot竞争转向Bertrand竞争。企业技术创新的研究与开发(R&D)获得成功之后,产品一旦进入市场,随之而来的就是潜在企业市场进入的威胁;通过技术创新,可以使企业在一段时间内成为某种商品的唯一生产者,因而可以进行垄断定价,从中获得更大的利润;垄断下的创新产品价格必大于边际成本,垄断企业创新产品的最优产量必低于社会最优产量;随着模仿者的进入,竞争越来越强,创新企业不得不压低价格以占领市场,或者进行新的技术创新,企业必须在不断的创新中求发展。
The essentiality of technological innovation of enterprise in the market competition was explained through the comparison of the game theory models about product differentiation under two market structures: Cournot duopoly of quantity-setting monopoly and Bertrand duopoly of price-setting monopoly. It is indicated that Cournot competition and Bertrand competition are dynamic instead of static in the real market. Along with the process of the competition, Cournot competition can switch to Bertrand competition. After the success of the R&D, once its products enter the market, subsequently potential threat of other enterprises is presented. Nevertheless, the enterprise can maintain to be the only producer of certain product within certain period of time. Therefore, price can be held and more profit can be obtained. With the entering of imitators, the monopoly enterprise is confronted with more serious competition. It is implied that enterprises must try to develop the continuous innovation in order to maintain its advantage in the markets.
出处
《石油化工高等学校学报》
CAS
2003年第1期82-86,共5页
Journal of Petrochemical Universities