归因是怎样影响假设思维的?

HOW DOES MENTAL SIMULATION AFFECT CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION?

考察了归因这一外力对假设思维的影响。研究发现归因对假设思维的影响力与选择原因大小成正比与事件后果严重程度成反比。当选择原因相对后果而言足够大时,假设思维将不服从“特例-常规”规律。在此基础上,根据是否存在外力将事件分为被迫事件和自由事件,并提出“特例-常规”规律(或是“做-不做”规律)只适合自由事件而不是所有事件。这一结果部分地解释了长期存在于实验研究与现场研究中的假设思维所表现出的差异。

This paper examined the effect of causal attribution on mental simulation under the framework of treating causal attribution as one kind of outside force. The results revealed that there is positive correlation between the power of causal attribution over counterfactual thinking with the reason of choice and negative correlation with the outcome of event. The exception - routine effect in counterfactual thinking would disappear in case of minor outcome followed by a strong reason. We distinguished free event and forced event from each other in the basis of the results and proposed that the exception-routine effect (or action - inaction effect) should only be applied to free events instead of all events. This finding partly explained the long - lasting differences between scenario experiment and field research on regret and counterfactual thinking.