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经理与投资者的投资决策博弈 被引量:2

Study on the Games of Investment Decision between Manager and Investor
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摘要 研究了在缺乏有效监督的情况下 ,公司经理在选取投资项目时往往是事实上的决策者 ,而且经理选取项目时投入的努力与投资者的预算约束决策是相互影响的。文中指出在单次博弈的情况下 ,投资者预算约束的软硬承诺对经理都是不可信的 ;在重复博弈的情况下 。 The manager is the actual decision maker without efficient control. There is a mutual influence between the efforts of the manager when he chooses the projects and the decision of budget constrain made by the investor. The commitment of the budget constrain decision made by the investor is not credible to the manager when the game is not a repeated game. Otherwise, whether the investors keep their words or lies on the scope and the distribution of the final revenue of the bad project.
出处 《系统工程理论方法应用》 2003年第1期45-48,共4页 Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
关键词 经理 投资者 投资决策 重复博弈 investment decision soft budge constraint
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参考文献5

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