财政集权与地方政府行为变化——从援助之手到攫取之手

Fiscal Re-centralization and Behavioral Change of Local Governments: From the Helping Hand to the Grabbing Hand

中央与地方政府之间分配财政资源的不同方式会引起地方政府的利益机制和行为的重大变化。本文构建一个中央与地方政府的博弈模型，并且采用省级数据来说明在９０年代中期伴随分税制而来的财政集权如何加剧了地方政府从“援助之手”到“攫取之手”的行为转变。研究发现，虽然中央政府从财政集权中受益，预算收入和经济增长速度却因地方政府的行为变化而显著下降。

Helping and grabbing hand behavior have different effects on the so- ciety.The helping hand is organized and assists development,whereas the grabbing hand is individualistic and disorganized,and impedes development.In this paper we set out a model of center-local tax competition and use provincial data to show how a change occurred from helping to grabbing hand behavior in China in the 1990s when the central government re-centralized tax revenue from provincial governments.The center benefited from fiscal re-centralization at the expense of the local governments.How- ever,budgetary revenue and economic growth rates declined because of the change from helping to grabbing hand behavior by local governments.