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道德风险引起的信贷配给及其治理 被引量:3

Credit Rationing Produced by Moral Hazard and It's Elimination
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摘要 在信息不对称条件下,拥有信息优势的借款者易于发生道德风险,即挪用借款用途于高风险项目和不偿还贷款,损害贷款人利益;处于信息劣势方的贷款人出于维护自身利益的目的,发生信贷配给行为,结果使双方利益均受损。因此,他们均有动力缓解信息不对称的程度,具体策略为实行贷款抵押和信贷承诺。
作者 穆争社
出处 《财贸研究》 北大核心 2002年第6期65-68,共4页 Finance and Trade Research
基金 陕西省社科基金课题<陕西中小企业融资的非对称信息问题研究>的阶段性成果
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