外部性,科斯定理与最优产权结构

Externality,Coase's Theorem and Optimal Property Rights Structure

私人成本和收益与社会成本和收益相背离是经济社会最普遍的问题之一。解决私人的边际收益与成本和社会边际收益与成本不一致所产生的问题的办法之一是庇古的政府解。罗纳德·科斯对此提出了强有力的挑战 ,认为帕累托最优资源分配 (在某些理想条件下 )可通过不求助于庇古的政府干预私下协商而达到 ,并且该私下解决方法独立于责任法规 (产权安排 ) (科斯定理 )。本文用一个简单的数学模型 ,分别讨论了存在外部性时的社会最优解、竞争市场解、庇古解和科斯解 ,并给出了一个数字例子来具体阐述产权安排与资源配置效率之间的关系。

Private cost and benefit deviates from social cost and benefit, this is one of the most common problem for economic society. One of such inconsistence is Pigou's government intervene. R.Coase gives a forceful challenge on Pigou's solution. Coase suggests that (in some ideal condition) Pareto-optimal resource allocation can be achieved by private bargain rather than Pigou's government intervene, and such private bargain is independent from liability statute (Coase's Theorem). This paper discusses social optimality, competition solution, Pigou's solution and Coase's solution under Externality respectively by a simple mathematic model, and using a numeral example to specify relationship between property rights and efficiency of resource allocation.