风险企业规避套牢问题的融资策略研究

How venture firm to avoiding hold-up problem in financial procedure

在风险企业融资过程中,套牢(hold＿up)问题是存在于风险投资家和风险企业家之间的一类主要的委托-代理问题。由于套牢问题的存在,使得风险投资家在为风险企业融资时,对风险企业家作出的投资回报承诺产生质疑,导致风险企业的有效投资不能实现。论文结合风险企业的阶段性融资需求特性,构建了防止套牢问题出现的检验模型,使风险企业家在融资过程中,产生使风险投资家确信的不存在套牢问题的投资回报承诺,从而,使风险企业获得发展资本.

Holdup problem, a main type of principalagency problem, lies in venture firm's financing procedure between venture capitalist and entrepreneur.Due to hold_up problem,the capitalist doubts that the entrepreneur would not pay the enough investment benefit to her or him after she or he finances the venture firm,which will lead to give up the effective investment for venture firm. This article designs an exam model to prevent from holdup problem, through which venture capitalist make sure that she or he would gain the investment payoff that entrepreneur committted.