事故责任规制及其法定预防标准问题的研究

Study on accident liability rules and problems of legal prevention standards

借助经济学的分析方法和工具,解释事故责任规则的预防事故激励机制,提出应依据事故的社会有效预防水平确立事故责任规则,并构建预防事故的定性分析模型,对不同事故责任规则的事故预防激励有效性进行比较,以确定各类事故相对应的最优责任规则。通过对比汉德公式与预防事故定性分析模型的分析结果,确定事故的社会有效预防水平与法定预防标准的一致性。但是,法定预防标准往往存在模糊性和不可预测性等问题。结合典型事故案例,分析我国安全生产法规和标准存在的问题及其对事故预防行为产生的重要影响,提出解决安全生产法规和标准存在问题的措施建议,进而提出完善我国安全生产事故责任规则的对策建议,促进建立有效遏制和防控重特大事故的长效机制。

By means of analysis methods and tools of economics,incentive mechanism of accident prevention in accident liability rules is explained,and it put forward that accident liability rules should be established on the basis of social effective level of accident prevention. The qualitative analysis model of accident prevention is built. By comparing the incentive effectiveness on accident prevention of different accident liability rules,the corresponding optimal liability rules on all kinds of accidents are determined. By comparing the analysis results of the Hand Formula and the qualitative analysis model of accident prevention,the consistency between social effective level of accident prevention and legal prevention standards is established. However,legal prevention standards tend to some disadvantages such as ambiguity and unpredictability. Combined with the typical accident cases in our country,the problems existing in regulations and standards of work safety in our country and their important influences on accident prevention behavior are analyzed,and the suggested measures to solve these problems are put forward. Furthermore,the suggested countermeasures to perfect accident liability rules of work safety in China are proposed,which could promote to establish long- term mechanism on effectively stemming and preventing major accidents in China.