工会组织集中化、谈判能力与产能过剩

Centralization of Trade Unions,Bargaining Power and Excess Capacity

去产能是供给侧结构性改革的重点,需要全面揭示其产生的根源。工会组织集中化和劳资双方谈判能力是影响产能产量决策的重要因素,与产能过剩具有密切关系。构建双寡头垄断竞争市场,构建由企业和工会参与的三阶段动态序贯博弈模型,探索工会组织集中化和谈判能力对产能过剩的影响,并揭示政府产能规制政策的效果。研究结果表明:与分散的工会组织相比,工会组织集中化不会导致产能过剩反而会出现产能不足,而且会降低社会福利;资方谈判能力与社会福利正相关,在工会组织分散的情况下不可过高;政府的产能规制政策未必会降低产能过剩程度,在分散的工会组织下甚至会降低社会福利。对此,要科学识别产能过剩,采取科学的产能规制政策;探索中国特色的工会制度;塑造和谐互赢的劳资关系。

Cutting excess production capacity is the key point of the structural reform of supplyside,and it requires a full disclosure of its origins.The centralization of trade unions and the bargaining power between labor and capital are important factors affecting the decision-making of capacity and output,which are closely related to excess capacity.This paper constructs a duopoly competitive market,a three stage dynamic sequential game model which is composed of enterprises and trade unions.It explores the influence of trade union’s centralization and bargaining power on excess capacity,and reveals the effect of government capacity regulation policy.The results show that compared with the decentralized trade unions,centralized trade union will not lead to excess capacity.Instead,there will be a lack of capacity and a decrease of social welfare.The bargaining power of the capital is positively related to the social welfare and can’t be too high in the case of decentralization of trade unions.Besides,the government’s capacity regulation policy may not necessarily reduce degree of excess capacity but may even reduce social welfare in a decentralized trade union.In this regard,it is necessary to scientifically identify excess capacity,adopt scientific capacity regulation policy,explore the trade union system with Chinese characteristics and create a harmonious and win-win relationship between labor and capital.